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Abstract 
World law
In the third millennium of the Christian era, which is characterised by the 
emergence of a world economy and eventually a world society, the concept of 
world law is needed to embrace not only the traditional disciplines of public 
international law, and comparative law, but also the common underlying legal 
principles applicable in world trade, world finance, transnational transfer of 
technology and other fields of world economic law, as well as in such emerging 
fields as the protection of the world's environment and the protection of universal 
human rights. World law combines inter-state law with the common law of 
humanity and the customary law of various world communities.
1. The term “world law”
In the twentieth century, for the first time in the history of the human race, most 
of the peoples of the world have been brought into more or less continual 
relations with each other. We speak without hesitation of a world economy, a 
world technology, world-wide communications, world organizations, world 
science, world literature, world scholarship, world travel, world sports. We speak
1 This article, originally published in the Fordham International Law Journal, is presented here 
with the permission of the aforementioned journal, with some changes, in tribute to Johan van 
der Vyver, whose important work, both scholarly and practical, in the area of universal human 
rights has made him an outstanding pioneer in the development of world law.
2 James Bar Ames is Emiritus Professor of Harvard University.
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almost as confidently of an emerging world society, despite the forces of ethnic 
and territorial disintegration that threaten it. May we not speak also of world law?
The term “world law” will, I believe, become more and more widely used as 
humanity moves into a new century and a new millennium. It will embrace, but 
not replace, both the term “international law”, introduced by Jeremy Bentham in 
1789, and the term “transnational law”, introduced by Philip Jessup in 1956. 
Eventual acceptance of the term world law will reflect as deep a conceptual 
change as that which occurred when the term “international law” replaced the 
older term “law of nations” (ius gentium).
In inventing the term “international law”, Bentham contended that “law of 
nations” was objectionable because it combined three mutually contradictory 
elements:
• Natural law, defined as a system of rules derived from natural reason and 
common to all civilized peoples, which Bentham said was not law at all (Janis, 
1984:405-407).
• Rules of mercantile and maritime law concerning private transactions that 
cross national boundaries, which Bentham said are governed by the applicable 
municipal law of one or another sovereign state.
• “The mutual transactions between sovereigns as such”, which alone, in 
Bentham’s view, could be called both “inter-national” (he spelled it with a 
hyphen) and law.3 As late as 1831, Bentham’s neologism was called “a 
frightfully barbarous title” and a “vile pollution” (Hogg, 1988:115); yet Janis 
(1984:415) points out that it had already been widely adopted,4 and in time the 
positivist theory of international law which it reflected also came largely to 
prevail (Boyle, 1985:18).
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the “frightfully barbarous title” has been 
stretched to cover matters that hardly fit within Bentham’s nationalist concept.
3 Bentham states: “The word inter-national, it must be acknowledged, is a new one”. He adds, 
however, that D’Aguesseau (1668-1751) had previously stated that “what is commonly called 
droit des gens ought rather to be termed droit entre les gens". Id. at 293-294; see lanis, supra 
note 1, on 408-409. Janis (1984) also quotes D’Aguesseau’s statement that jus gentium would 
be rendered more appropriately as jus inter gentes. Id. on 409, n 27.
4 Even in his lifetime, Bentham saw the success of his new term. Not only in English but in other 
languages (e.g., droit international, intemationales Recht, derecho international, 
intemationaal recht), Bentham’s concept caught hold. The older notion, the “law of nations”, 
where it is still used, is commonly thought to be fungible with “international law”. Janis (1984), 
supra note 1, on 415.
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Especially after World War II, scholars began to look for new names to designate 
areas of law that transcend “mutual transactions between sovereigns as such”. 
One such name was “United Nations law” or, more broadly, “the law of world 
organizations”. Another was “the law of human rights”. The most ambitious 
effort to find a name that would correspond to the realities of a new world order, 
however, was Jessup’s proposal to replace the term “international law” by the 
term “transnational law”. “The term ‘international’ is misleading”, Jessup 
(1956:1) wrote, “since it suggests that one is concerned only with the relations of 
one nation (or state) to other nations (or states)”. A term is needed, he said, to 
identify “the law applicable to the complex interrelated world community which 
may be described as beginning with the individual and reaching up to the so- 
called family of nations or society of states” (Jessup, 1956:1). [T]he word 
‘international’ is inadequate to describe the problem ... the term “international 
law” will not do (Jessup, 1956:1).
[I] shall use, instead of ‘international law,’ the term ‘transnational law’ to 
include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national 
frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are other 
rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories” (Jessup, 1956:2).
The breadth of Jessup’s definition is counteracted to a certain extent by the word 
“transnational”, which takes the national state as a basic point of reference. When 
Jessup himself gave examples of matters that would be covered by 
“transnational” law, they were usually problems that ultimately involved “mutual 
transactions between sovereigns as such”. Indeed, the word “transnational” refers 
back to the era of sovereign national states and indicates that it is to be 
transcended. It does not, however, give a new name to the new era that all 
humanity has entered. The right name for the new era, I submit, is “emerging 
world society”, and the right name for the law by which it is governed is “world 
law”.5
5 An important and widely used course-book entitled Transnational Legal Problems (Steiner et 
al., 1994:iii-iv) identifies as transnational “the ways in which a nation reacts to such problems 
as trade and monetary flows, how it controls immigration or regulates foreign conduct 
threatening its interests, and, in general, the ways in which its domestic policies necessarily 
affect other countries and their nationals”.
S]uch expression of an international legal system can be viewed as having a 
transnational character. Together with public international law and with regulation 
by international organizations, such phases of international law form a ... complex 
to which this book refers as ... ‘transnational law’.
Although this definition comes fairly close to what I call world law, nevertheless, 
“transnational” topics are usually treated by the authors in the context of their significance for 
inter-state relations.
Koers 64(2 & 3] 1999:379-384 381
World law
2. World law ... the law of the world economy
World law is, in part, the law of the world economy. The world economy is not 
only a “transnational” economy; that is, it does not consist only of “foreign” 
trade, “foreign” investment, “foreign” exchange transactions, and other types of 
activity carried on across national boundaries. It consists also of certain types of 
activities carried on within a given national state by citizens of that state. Certain 
types of trade, investment, and financial transactions carried on, for example, 
between US business firms in New York and California may constitute an 
integral part of world trade, world investment, and world finance. We live not 
only in an “international” economy but also in a “world” of interdependent 
domestic economies. Moreover, the law that governs economic transactions 
between business firms in New York and California may be New York law or 
California law or US federal law, but it may also be world law. If, for example, 
goods are shipped from California to New York by vessel via the Panama Canal, 
the ocean bill of lading will normally have the same legal character as an ocean 
bill of lading used in an export-import transaction between enterprises in any two 
countries in the world: it will constitute (a) the carrier’s receipt for the goods, (b) 
evidence of the contract of carriage, and (c) a document of title. If payment for 
the goods (whether shipped by vessel, by rail, or by air) is by letter of credit, such 
credit will normally be subject to the same rules as those that govern letter-of- 
credit transactions throughout the world. The exporters and importers of the 
world, the shipowners of the world, the bankers of the world, the marine 
insurance underwriters of the world, and others associated with them, including 
their lawyers, form a world community that, over the centuries, has made, and 
continues to make, the law by which their various types of transactions are 
governed (Berman, 1988:235; Berman & Dasser, 1990:21-36). And many parts 
of that law may be applicable to domestic commercial transactions as well. 
Formally, the law applicable to a commercial transaction may be municipal law, 
but the municipal court will enforce the contract terms, and in certain types of 
transactions those terms are the customary terms used in world trade and, in that 
sense, constitute world law.
3. Patterns and norms of behaviour
The law of world trade is, of course, regulated in part by international 
conventions as well as by the laws of national states. So far as its strictly 
commercial aspects are concerned, however, its primary source is in the patterns 
and norms of behaviour of those who engage in it. Blackstone and his 
predecessors properly called it ius gentium, having in mind the older meaning of 
that term, “the law of peoples”, applicable everywhere. It may also be called 
“transnational law”, but that name does not suggest its universality, that is, its 
applicability to economic actors in carrying out certain types of domestic as well 
as foreign activities.
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The law of transfer of goods is, of course, only one part of world economic law. 
The law governing transfer of currencies and related financial transactions is 
another. The law governing direct foreign investment is a third. International law 
and national law play a greater role in the regulation of foreign exchange 
transactions and direct foreign investment than in the regulation of world trade 
transactions. Yet a customary world law based on the contract practices of 
economic actors plays an important role even with respect to money and 
investment. In addition, parallel developments in the national legislation of 
different countries as well as the adoption of international agreements have made 
substantial contributions to world law in those areas, as they have also in the area 
of transfer of goods. When one speaks of world law, therefore, one must include 
within it not only world customary law, in the sense indicated above, but also 
international law in Bentham’s sense and transnational law in Jessup’s sense.
4. Other types of world communities
In addition to the world communities of persons engaged in world trade, finance, 
investment, and other economic activities, there are many other types of world 
communities, including those represented by some thirty-five thousand voluntary 
not-for-profit non-governmental world organizations registered with the United 
Nations with members from many different countries. These include organizations 
engaged in the world-wide advancement of human rights, of medicine and health, 
of natural and social sciences, of engineering, travel, civil and political rights, 
charity and relief, environmental protection, world peace, international law, sports 
and leisure, and a large number of other activities (Boli & Thomas, 1995). The 
interests that these associations represent constitute a vast infrastructure of world 
intercourse, involving patterns and norms of behaviour that give rise to 
universally recognized rights and duties. It is not mere coincidence that the rules 
of air traffic control, to take one example, are identical at every major airport in 
the world.
That humankind, in the aftermath of two world wars, has reached a turning point 
in its history, that the world has entered a new era of global interdependence, that 
all inhabitants of Planet Earth share a common destiny, is a historical fact, a 
political fact, an economic fact, a sociological fact, that has finally penetrated the 
consciousness of most of the earth’s inhabitants. It has had a harder time 
penetrating legal scholarship or the curriculum of American law schools, which 
remain, for most students, provincial in the extreme. Even those students who 
take one or two elective courses in international law or comparative law or law of 
international trade and investment are not usually exposed to the interactions 
among these fields or to the interactions of all three with the customary law of 
communities that transcend national boundaries.
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Practising lawyers, on the other hand, are increasingly involved in world law. In 
the pregnant words of Benno Schmidt, former dean of Columbia Law School and 
later president of Yale University, “the world has replaced the nation as the 
context within which the professions operate”. The law schools need the help of 
the practising profession in developing a curriculum in world law. At the same 
time, the practising lawyers whose clients are engaged in cross-border trans­
actions need the help of scholars who are able to give a broader comparative and 
historical perspective, and a synthesis, to the myriad of practical problems with 
which the practitioners must deal.
The Benthamite concept that only sovereign states make law, and that 
consequently international law is made only by agreements between or among 
sovereign states, eliminated from the traditional sources of the law of nations both 
the common features of the various legal systems of the civilized world, 
previously characterized as natural law, and mercantile and maritime law, which 
were examples of the customary law of transnational communities. Let us leave 
the definition of international law as it is, but let us find a new name that will 
once again combine inter-state law with the common law of humanity, on the one 
hand, and the customary law of various world communities, on the other. We 
speak of a world economy, not only an international economy or even a 
transnational economy; its constituents are not only states but also, and primarily, 
economic enterprises. Similarly we will come, I believe, in the very near future, to 
speak of world law.
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